Product Description

In late 2003, Stanford University professor and democracy expert Larry Diamond was personally asked by his former colleague Condoleezza Rice to serve as an advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, a position he accepted with equal parts "hesitation and conviction." He opposed the initial invasion of Iraq, but "supported building the peace," and felt the U.S. had a moral imperative to reconstruct Iraq as a democratic and prosperous nation. Before going to Iraq he had serious doubts about whether the U.S. could actually do this--an opinion that was solidified after spending three months working with the CPA. Squandered Victory is his insider's examination of what went wrong in Iraq after the initial invasion. Diamond details a long list of preventable blunders and missed opportunities, from President Bush's decision to give the Pentagon the lead responsibility for the management of postwar Iraq to the CPA's inability to work with Iraqi leaders such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Diamond expresses admiration for CPA Administrator L. Paul Bremer, whom he believes was sincere about wanting to bring democracy to Iraq, yet points out that he was wholly unprepared and unrealistic about the task, resulting in "one of the major overseas blunders in U.S. history." In his descriptions of confrontations with Bremer, Diamond shows him as unwilling to diverge from paths that were obviously failing.

As an academic with an expertise in democracy building, Diamond sometimes seems more comfortable with theories than practical solutions, but he did experience the process in Iraq from the inside and provides a useful background on the various ethnic and religious groups vying for power there. He claims that he remains hopeful, but his optimism lies more with the abilities of the Iraqi people than with the U.S. government, since the difficult process of democratization will likely take much more time and effort than the U.S. can afford to spend. --Shawn Carkonen

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Product Details

Publisher	Holt Paperbacks
ISBN	0805080082
Format	Paperback
Author	Larry Diamond
EAN	9780805080087
Label	Holt Paperbacks
Edition	First Edition
Dewey Decimal Number	956.70443
Studio	Holt Paperbacks
Number Of Pages	416
Title	Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq
Release Date	2006-03-21
Publication Date	2006-03-21
Manufacturer	Holt Paperbacks

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Customer Reviews

The First Bush War

Review by Scholasticus, 2010-03-03

Sad but true. Entering a war with dishonorable motives (i.e., lying about WMD and then changing war goals to nation building and establishment of democracy) only gets the imperialist into more trouble. Fortunately for the US, it had enough money to get through this little bush war, but imagine what one trillion dollars could do to alleviate poverty and ignorance in America over the past eight years. The American political class has the farsightedness of a common mole. Frank Wallis explored similar themes in his _Iraq 2003: Causes and Consequences of an Imperial Expedition_ (Editions Tour Blanche, 2007). ISBN: 978-0963833211.

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Are we all missing part of the puzzle?

Review by William C. Greene, 2008-12-31

In Larry Diamond's other books, "Democritization in Africa," and "The Spirit of Democracy," he makes it very clear that building a democracy from a dictatorship is no easy matter. He laments at length the "virtual democracies" in Africa that have emerged to satisfy "international norms of presentability" but really do no more than serve as instruments of regime consolidation. There are few success stories in this field. So, it seems odd that he became so disillusioned months into the job in Iraq. One reviewer suggested naivete to think some lectures on our Constitution and a few meetings for a few months, or even years, could make all these Iraqi factions make nice with each other.

However, the author has a gripping inside story to tell of what those early days were like. The initial situation certainly was forbidding, our tanks had just rolled through Baghdad, but insurgencies of many varieties had slipped off to come back and harass the occupiers.I'm sure it appeared grim, with only a small prospect of creating a self-governing democracy out of that chaos. That is why I sympathize with the author's despair, but would like to have seen more patience, or grit to see it through.

I would also have liked more detail from the author on whether there would have been any significant increase in a hope for success even if the U. S. post-invasion involvement had been flawless. Those religious/minority/jihad movements all were huge obstacles under any circumstances. The book might have been improved with more emphasis given to the problems of predicting time periods required for any full democritization of different types of subject nations.

The U. S. Armed Forces devoted about ten years to occupying Germany and Japan after WWII and eventually left with a basic functioning democracy in place. But those nations had few internal factions to muddy the waters. Germany was part of the Western tradition of freedom, and had had a democratic government, albeit briefly. Iraq had to be one of the most difficult places on earth to democritize--and results to date indicate this to be so. But there are a few positive signs of late. This book, and many of the reviews may be premature in judgment. As Yogi Berra said, "It ain't over till it's over."

The book, like most books on the Iraq occupation, gives admirable detail concerning the things the U. S. Forces did wrong, or got around to doing too late. We all know the museum got looted, and Rumsfeld gets the usual criticism for saying, "Stuff happens." But stuff does happen. I think Clemenceau said, "War is a series of disasters followed by victory." And that's what happened. The real fighting ended, then the insurgency was probably worse than expected, and continues, but I would say a form of victory has been achieved. The Iraqis have a chance now to build what they might from the temporary reprieve given to them from Sadaam's horrors.

However, in evaluating the nitty-gritty details of the democritization process, it would have been helpful if the author had placed the entire Iraq operation in its fuller context. There were many reasons for toppling Sadaam. The administration has been constantly attacked by those who claim Bush justified the invasion exclusively on the need to find the WMD's. But here, in "Squandered Victory," the administration is attacked because it's alleged purpose of democritizing Iran isn't going smoothly. Other criticisms have been based on some conspiracy theory about oil, Dick Ceney, or a Saudi-Bush alliance! I have always assumed that none of those considerations were the primary motives for going into Iraq.

Dennis Ross, who has served both Bush and Clinton in Middle Eastern affairs, has pointed out that one might like, but cannot expect a consistency between rhetorical goals and foreign policy behavior. It is neither easy nor wise to try and meet such a standard. A Football coach does not spell out his real game plan before the game, or before the contest is long over, if then! Hopefully, there is a brilliant-chess-playing strategy in foreign policy, as in any contest, and I suspect the main element here was to undermine the home bases of terrorists. Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and every nation were put in play and impacted. There has been a liberalization and growing freedom and prosperity in almost all the minor Kingdoms in the Gulf that may have been encouraged by American effots to topple Sadaam and Al Quaida. Even Libya leaned our way when they saw the Sadaam statues pulled down by celebrating mobs. If democritization in Iraq happens, so much the better!

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Detailed story of the tragedy of post-war Iraq

Review by C. B Collins Jr., 2008-01-20

Larry Diamond is an internationally recognized expert on the processes, concepts and development of democracies. Thus it made perfect sense for Condoleza Rice to ask him to go into post-war Iraq and assist with the transition of Iraq to a democracy. This book details his experiences in Iraq from which he draws his conclusions about the many errors the United States made in regard to Iraq. The first nine chapters cover his experiences in Iraq. The tenth chapter summarizes the mistakes he thinks were made by the United States. The eleventh and final chapter covers his future predictions as to how Iraq will now evolve and whether democracy is possible under the conditions he observed while serving his nation in Iraq.

There were mistakes made in regard to the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. The war itself will probably be seen by future generations as the major mistake made, however management of the occupation was a tragedy. There was a plan to quickly win the war but no plan how to secure the peace and maintain the victory. Neo-conservatives had been lead to believe unrealistic scenarios fabricated by Iraqi expatriates such as Ahmed and Salem Chalabi. The US only provided support to the Oil Ministry building in Baghdad and all other buildings were ransacked. The US War College oddly enough had fully predicted much of the chaos that would occur if insufficient troops were used to secure the victory. A major tragedy was that there were not enough quality supplies and materials available to the US servicemen and women post invasion. It was as if no planning what-so-ever had occurred as to how to secure the victory. The lives of these young men and women who died because the $400,000 canvas-top covered Hummers offered no real protection lies at the feet of Secretary Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, the Vice President and the President.

Diamond would point out that the lack of post-war planning prior to the invasion would have to rank as one of the greatest mistakes made, one which had many unintended negative consequences for the Iraqi people and for the image of the United States. The neo-conservatives were dismissive of the UN yet needed the UN to offer the US coverage after the invasion. The British were insistent upon a larger role for the UN since it gave the invasion more legitimacy. The US wanted the UN to cover the US in regard to world opinion but never interfere in the occupational decisions.

Another major mistake documented by Diamond is the disbanding of the entire Iraqi army of 700,000 soldiers as well as disbanding the civil infrastructure of teachers, librarians, college professors, civil servants, etc., al of which numbered around 400,000 persons. Thus the very forces that might help hold the country together were disbanded. Diamond indicates that one negative consequence of disbanding the military is that the borders were no longer secure, which allowed terrorists, spies, and other forces that wished to stimulate insurgency ready access to Iraq. Iran took immediate advantage of this major mistake and began to fill the power vacuum by ensuring that Shiite Iraqis sympathetic to and under Iran's influence received funds, weapons, and support to foster insurgency.

A third major mistake was misunderstanding the cultures of Iraqi's major ethnic and religious groups. Diamond reports that young inexperienced Americans with inability to speak Arabic or with no background knowledge of the region were given vast responsibilities which they carried out in insensitive manners, frequently making matters worse rather than better.

This is especially true in regard to Ayatollah Sistani, the leading religious influence and leader of the Shiites. Sistani had the ability to undermine every US effort and yet he was never engaged in a respectful manner and when he was eventually engaged by the US, much harm in relationships had occurred. This is a critical point because whereas the US wished Iraq to become a democracy with federalist attributes to protect the rights and resources of the Kurds, the Shiites recognized that with 60% of the population they could establish a democracy and yet maintain control of the entire country due to their numbers. Thus the Shiites wished for early elections, quick removal of the US, and then domination of the new government. Sistani was key to slowing down this rush to power which could stimulate a civil war and yet since he was never engaged properly he continued to support elections, starting with elections to determine who would write the new constitution. After months of work writing a new temporary constitution with appointed Iraqis, the Shiites walked out and refused to sign. This could have been avoided had Sistani been included more often in a meaningful way. In addition, whereas Iran has a theocracy where laws are reviewed and approved by religious leaders before enactment, Sistani was more liberal in his interpretation of the role of Islam in a democratic society. He was a potential ally. Whereas there are Shiite factions that receive support, funds, training and information from Iran; Sistani has not lined up with these forces and remains an Iraqi nationalists, resistant to undue influence from Iran. Sistani was also highly suspicious of the US efforts to divest the oil interests into private hands as quickly as possible.

A fourth major mistake was the assumption of the neo-conservatives in the highest leadership positions in the Pentagon that the Iraqis would accept us with open arms as liberators and that the movement toward democracy would be speedy. The fostering of the democratic process requires multiple structural supports and cultural precursors. The neo-conservatives continued to have a negative influence on all decisions made after the invasion. They did this by vetting decisions made by the new Iraqi provisional council through Bremmer. Bremmer would negotiate a deal only to have it undermined by the neo-conservatives in Washington.

Many of these mistakes lead to the two front insurgencies that occurred. The rise of al-Sadr and his Mahdi army was a highly negative force, disrupting much of the southern sections of Iraq where the Shiite majority resides. The Mahdi army created makeshift Sharia courts and tried and executed Iraqis for violation of Islamic law. Entire gypsy villages were destroyed due to the conflict between gypsy culture and Islamic law.

The insurgency has many faces and origins now, resulting from multiple nationalistic, ethnic, cultural, and criminal influences. Unfortunately the unemployment of 700,000 soldiers provided ample manpower for the various factions. In addition, poor control of conventional Iraqi weapons meant they quickly fell into the hands of the insurgency, making life much more risky for US armed forces. Further incompetence lead to US funded weapons for police services also being diverted to the various insurgencies.

Diamond and his colleagues worked hard to educate the people of Iraq about Federalism, a political conception that would allow for the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds to move toward democracy, form a central government, share power and resources, and maintain minority rights. They worked hard to create a transitional government and transitional constitution that would guide the way toward democracy. Yet they lacked resources. Not only did they need hard cars to travel safely around the country, there were insufficient educational and media campaign resources and materials. The democracy education process was vastly under resourced, as were resources needed just for personal safety of US citizens working in Iraq.

Diamond, upon leaving Iraq, writes Condoleza Rice a detailed assessment outlining his fear of the high potential for civil war in Iraq. There were pitfalls in holding elections too soon and pitfalls in holding them too late.

What does the future hold? Diamond pointed out that tremendous resources were being used to build military bases in Iraq. The case seems clear that the US sees that it must be in Iraq for an additional ten to twenty years to ensure a stable Iraq that can counter the force and influence of Iran. These bases help protect and support our four major clients in the region: Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

Diamond suggests that the US consider allowing an agency such as USAID to specialize in post conflict reconstruction. He suggests that Sistani was correct that local elections for mayors should have begun early so as to build the capacity to understand democracy at a local level and then move to regional and then national levels. Diamond's final chapter would indicate that the forces toward democracy are many and sometimes they seem counter-intuitive. Despite the mistakes there is still hope.

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Very Interesting

Review by MD, 2007-03-08

This is an interesting book. Anyone who is interested in an alternative to the right wing talk radio and tv news should seriously consider checking out the Thom Hartmann radio show opposite Rush Limbaugh weekdays at: thomhartmann dot com / showlisten.shtml

Whether democrat, republican, or indepedent, so many of the facts out there are completely ignored by the mainstream media and talk shows. This show is one strong example of an examination of the facts regardless of your political affiliation. I am not affiliated with the show in any way, just struck by the facts so many seem to ignore.

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another expert ignored

Review by Daniel B. Clendenin, 2007-01-18

In late 2003 Condoleezza Rice telephoned her friend and Stanford colleague Larry Diamond of the Hoover Institution to ask him to go to Iraq as a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Although he had opposed the war with Iraq, after the fact he considered it a "moral imperative" to do everything within our power to establish a democracy there. As an expert in democratic development around the world, both as a scholar and an adviser-practitioner on the ground, few people are more qualified. He believed the Iraqis truly wanted democracy and were willing to work for it. He clearly has no axe to grind, and no compulsion to justify or condemn. Nor did he think the task was hopeless, at least when he went. He believes our intentions were good, and he is eager to give credit to the CPA and Iraqis where it is due.

Diamond spent four months in Baghdad (January to April 2004), and I think it is safe to say that few people worked harder or with more conviction, passion, enthusiasm, and sense of duty than he did. His book went to press in January 2005 right after the election results were announced. While there he focused his efforts on two tasks --he was one of the five drafters of the interim constitution, and he crisscrossed the country (until it became too unsafe to do so) promoting democracy development through speeches, conferences, town hall meetings, print and news media, seminars, and the like.

From the start, though, the Bush plan was a long shot. Imposing a democracy by force is oxymoronic, wherever you might try it. Attempting it in the Middle East, the only place in the world without a single democratic government, decreases your odds of success. The "cardinal sin," in Diamond's mind, was the pre-emptive war in the first place, for this put the United States on a course of "path dependence." A trajectory was set in motion, a chain reaction of events was unleashed, and almost none of it is reversible. A distinguished diplomat likened this to driving down a one-way street in the wrong direction; no matter what turns you make thereafter you are making more wrong turns. That's your best case scenario.

Now compound this with the "staggering failures" that the Bush administration made at "virtually every turn"-- no post-war plan to secure the peace; substantial under-resourcing in troops, equipment, and money; an artificial time table to write a constitution, sell it to the country, and hold elections; interagency turf wars between governmental agencies and especially between the State Department and the Pentagon; disbanding the Iraqi army and de-Baathification that sidelined the only people in Iraq who knew how to rule; grossly underestimating Iraqi nationalism, resentment, disaffection, and suspicions of American motives; making numerous, important decisions in an unapologetically autocratic and undemocratic fashion (a point not lost on Iraqis); a dismissive and flippant contempt for all criticisms; willful and arrogant delusions; wishful thinking and bad information; ostracizing the United Nations; and horrible miscalculations regarding Sistani, Muqtada al-Sadr and Fallujah.

As the violent insurgency engulfed Iraq, Diamond watched much of what he and his CPA colleagues had accomplished unravel. Back in the United States, he decided not to return to Iraq. On April 26, 2004, he wrote his friend of twenty years, Condi Rice, a detailed, confidential memo. He never heard back. He has concluded that the Iraqi fiasco is well on its way to becoming "one of the major overseas blunders in US history." In his sharpest critique in the entire book, Diamond charges the Bush administration with "negligence on a monumental scale." He insists he means this not as a rhetorical flourish or verbal towel-snapping, but in the technical, legal sense of "gross or criminal negligence."

It will be years if not decades before a final verdict on Iraq is in, so predictions are risky. Oddly enough, Diamond still hopes that democracy of some attenuated sort might work in Iraq. For that to happen, three conditions must be met: the play of politics must be inclusive enough to encompass Sunnis and Kurds who feel threatened. Related, a balance of power must insure that no single group dominates the rest. In these first two conditions rests the contradiction between minority rights sought by the Kurds and Sunnis, and majority rule sought by the Shiites. Finally, Iraq's emerging politicians must evidence pragmatic flexibility as opposed to ideological rigidity.

If you read the newspapers, you do not learn much at all new in Diamond's book. What makes it compelling is his unique qualifications and inspirational dedication to the task. At the end of the day, if I was an insurgent who had the least bit of doubt whether my efforts were thwarting America's ill-conceived plans, I would be greatly heartened by this first person narrative of someone who chronicled his personal experiences up close and personal. So far we have been "simply overmatched" for a post-war conflict for which we were "grossly unprepared" (p. 291).

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